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1. Introduction 
Cooperation problems are one of the most common and important features of our modern 
society. During the recent few decades, economists have devoted efforts to understanding 
people’s cooperation behavior in dilemma situations; and have found that peer-to-peer 
punishment opportunities can be effective in promoting cooperation under some conditions (e.g., 
Fehr and Gächter 2000, Nikiforakis and Normann 2008). They have also demonstrated that 
neither people’s cooperation decisions nor punishment decisions are homogeneous. It is now 
known that there are multiple human types with regards to cooperation and punishment. 
Regarding cooperative types, it has been known that some people have preferences for 
cooperation in dilemmas. Moreover, many researchers have proposed that there exist some 
people that conditionally cooperate dependent upon decisions of others (e.g., Fischbacher et al. 
2001, Kurzban and Houser 2005). As for punishment types, there are many studies finding not 
only various unconditional punishing behaviors, but also counter-punishing behaviors. For 
instance, anti-social punishers impose a fine on cooperators (e.g., Cinyabuguma et al. 2006, 
Herrmann et al. 2008). Moreover, when some low cooperators are punished by high cooperators, 
they anti-socially retaliate against the high cooperators, given a counter-punishing opportunity 
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(e.g., Nikiforakis 2008).  Some people engage in punishment of non-punishers or that of anti-
social punishers (e.g., Denant-Boemont et al. 2007). However, surprisingly little attention has 
been paid to how people’s punishment decisions to a person may depend on punishment 
decisions of others to that person.  
Studying people’s conditional punishment behaviors is important especially for three 
reasons. First, understanding a person’s punishment decisions in relation to others’ contributes to 
an advancement in the economic theory as it gives us more micro-level data regarding people’s 
punishment behaviors. Second, if multiple types of punishers are present, then, incorporating the 
task of eliciting the punisher types in experiments, likewise cooperative types elicited in other 
past studies, would allow us to interpret subjects’ decisions more easily and precisely (e.g., by 
studying the relation between conditional punishment types and their institutional choices). Third, 
providing evidence on the prevalence of heterogeneous conditional punishment types would 
stimulate both theoretical and experimental research on the roles of conditional punishment types 
in the evolution of cooperation norms. For instance, Szolnoki and Perc (2013) theoretically show 
that what they call conditional punishers – those who impose a fine with a strength proportional 
to the number of punishers in their own groups – can play an important role in promoting 
cooperation.
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This paper elicits people’s conditional punishment types by conducting experiments 
using a strategy method. We find that subjects on average punish a non-cooperator at a strength 
positively proportional to the punishment by other members. We find, however, that subjects’ 
individual conditional punishment decisions are heterogeneous and that around half of the 
subjects do not punish a person, no matter how many punishment points other members assign to 
that person. We call this punishment type the free-rider. Moreover, our data indicates that the 
classification of conditional punishment types helps us explain people’s unconditional altruistic 
as well as anti-social punishment decisions. 
The rest of the paper proceeds as follows: Section 2 describes our experimental design. 
Section 3 reports results, and Section 4 concludes. 
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2. Experimental Design 
 The basic game frame we use in the experiment is voluntary contribution mechanism. 
Each subject is randomly assigned to a group of four, is given an endowment of 10 points, and 
decides whether they allocate the 10 points to either their private account or public account. 
When a subject allocates it to her private account, she will obtain 10 points as her payoff. By 
contrast, when the subject allocates it to her group’s public account, all group members, 
including her, obtain 5 points each as their payoffs. In other words, the MPCR (Marginal Per-
Capita Return) is 0.5. We call those who allocate their endowment to their public (private) 
account the cooperators (non-cooperators) in this paper. 
 Once all subjects make their allocation decisions, they subsequently make conditional 
punishment decisions. Each subject can assign up to four punishment points to each member. 
The punishment points must be integer. For each punishment point he assigns to a member, he 
loses one point from his payoff, and the punished loses three points from her payoff. In the 
conditional punishment stage, each subject makes 18 (= 2  9) decisions, contingent on whether 
the target is a cooperator or a non-cooperator (2 possibilities), and also on how many punishment 
points on average the other two members in his group assign to the target (= {0.0, 0.5, 1.0, 1.5, 
2.0, 2.5, 3.0, 3.5, 4.0}), of which there are nine possibilities. We refer to this list of 18 
punishment decisions as the “conditional punishment schedule.” Once all subjects complete their 
conditional punishment schedules, they move on to the unconditional punishment stage. In this 
stage, they are informed of the allocation decisions made by the three other members in their 
groups and then make unconditional punishment decisions to each member. The conditional 
punishment decision is incentive-compatible as follows: once everyone makes their 
unconditional punishment decisions, one schedule out of the four in each group is randomly 
selected to be used as the conditional punishment schedule.
2
 The instructions are available on-
line as a supplementary content.  
 Standard theory predictions are straightforward: all allocate their endowments to their 
private accounts, and no one penalizes others. However, social preference models such as Fehr 
and Schmidt (1999) predict that some allocate their endowments to the public account, and some 
punish non-cooperators. Assuming cooperator j is only concerned about the income inequality 
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 This procedure is often used in similar studies including Fischbacher et al. 
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with non-cooperator i, the income inequality-averse model predicts more punishment from j to i 
when the other two members punish i less, because otherwise the income inequality between i 
and j would be large (See Appendix Table B.1).  
3. Results 
 We conducted experiments at University of Michigan in February 2014. All experiments 
were neutrally framed. 52 undergraduate students participated in the experiments. No subject 
participated in more than one session. The experiments lasted around 45 minutes on average. The 
average per-subject payment (including a participation fee of $5) was $17.35. 
 Fig.1 reports the total average conditional punishment schedule in our experiment.
3
 The 
total average conditional punishment decisions to a non-cooperator are significantly increasing in 
the amount of the other members’ average punishment to the non-cooperator. This pattern cannot 
be rationalized if we assume that a decision-maker is only concerned about the income inequality 
between her and the punished (See predictions based on inequality-averse models in Section 2). 
This instead suggests that (a) she does not care how small a payoff the non-cooperator obtains 
but (b) she does care about the income inequality between her and other punishers.  
 Moreover, intriguingly, we find that the total average conditional punishment decisions to 
a cooperator are also significantly increasing in the others’ punishment toward the cooperator, 
although the strength of punishment is significantly less than that to a non-cooperator. This 
pattern cannot be explained by reciprocity or income inequality models since the cooperator 
behaves nicely to his group members and his payoff cannot be any higher than theirs. This 
pattern can be, however, explained by Levine (1998) which assumes some individuals have 
spiteful preferences.  
Result 1: The total average conditional punishment decisions are positively proportional to the 
other members’ punishment decisions, whether the target of punishment is a cooperator or non-
cooperator.  
 Fig.1 also shows the average conditional punishment schedules for each of cooperators 
and non-cooperators. The total average punishment schedules of both cooperative types resemble 
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the one of all subjects, but the strength of punishment differs by cooperative type. We find that 
on average non-cooperators conditionally punish both cooperative types at a statistically similar 
strength, whereas cooperators conditionally punish a non-cooperator more strongly.
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Result 2: Non-cooperators on average conditionally punish both cooperative types at a 
statistically similar strength, but cooperators on average conditionally assign significantly 
larger punishment points to a non-cooperator than to a cooperator. 
 A closer look at our data reveals that individuals’ conditional punishment schedules are 
heterogeneous. Appendix Fig. B.1 shows individual punishment schedules. The majority of 
subjects, around 53.8% of them, are free-rider types. This is not surprising because punishment 
activities fall under a second-order free-riding problem.  
 The second largest type, which accounts for around 23.1% of the subjects, is the 
conditional punisher. We define that a subject is a conditional punisher if the Spearman’s  
between his conditional punishment points to a non-cooperator and the remaining others’ 
average punishment points to the non-cooperator is significantly positive at the 5% level. These 
conditional punishers can be further classified into the “pro-social conditional punishers” (15.4% 
of the subjects) and the “anti-social conditional punishers” (7.7% of them). The pro-social 
conditional punishers punish a non-cooperator at a strength positively proportional to the other 
members’ punishment toward the non-cooperator, but do not conditionally punish a cooperator. 
The anti-social conditional punishers punish non-cooperators in the same manner as the pro-
social conditional punishers do, and they also conditionally punish cooperators in some way 
unlike pro-social conditional punishers.
5
  Recent theoretical research has indicated that anti-
social punishment can be evolutionary favored (e.g., Rand et al. 2010). Our finding that some 
may conditionally, anti-socially punish cooperators is new and adds a more detailed schedule of 
anti-social punishers, as the punishment schedule of the pro-social conditional punishers, to the 
existing literature. Studying the evolutionary advantage of the anti-social conditional punishers, 
along with that of the pro-social conditional punishers, in a theoretical model would be an 
interesting area for future research. 
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 We also find that four cooperators punish a non-cooperator with a strength significantly 
negatively proportional to others’ punishment toward the non-cooperator. This suggests that 
some cooperators make their punishment decisions mainly considering the income inequality 
between themselves and the target. 
Result 3: Individual conditional punishment schedules are heterogeneous. 53.8% of subjects are 
free-riders. The second largest category is the conditional punisher (23.1% of subjects). 66.7% 
of the conditional punishers do not conditionally punish cooperators, but 33.3% of them 
conditionally punish them as well. 
 Lastly, the elicited conditional punishment schedules of individuals are useful in 
predicting people’s unconditional punishment decisions, either altruistic (e.g., Fehr and Gächter 
2000) or anti-social (e.g., Herrmann et al. 2008). We find that those who at least once 
conditionally assign positive punishment points to a non-cooperator (all conditional punishment 
types except free-riders) on average impose significantly positive fines on non-cooperators in the 
unconditional punishment stage. By contrast, those who conditionally assign positive punishment 
points at least once to a cooperator (anti-social conditional punishers or other anti-social 
punishers) on average impose significantly positive fines on cooperators in that stage (see 
Appendix Table B.3).  
Result 4: Those who conditionally assign positive punishment points at least once to a non-
cooperator (cooperator) punish non-cooperators (cooperators) significantly in the unconditional 
punishment stage. 
4. Conclusion 
 This paper provides the first classification results regarding people’s conditional 
punishment types. Our evidence has a significant potential in enriching many experimental 
research areas as people’s decisions such as institutional choices might differ by conditional 
punishment type.  In addition to the importance of our study outlined in Section 1, our result has 
a significant implication for why punishment opportunities can effectively enhance cooperation. 
Although free-riders are the largest population group, around 23% of the subjects are conditional 
punishers. The conditional punishers are willing to expend their money to punish a non-
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cooperator if others do so, and they do not care about how small a payoff the punished receives. 
The threat of being “severely” punished by coordinated conditional punishers might be an 
important factor of the observed success of punishing institutions in dilemma situations.  
Acknowledgement: I thank Yan Chen for her hospitality in letting me conduct the experiments 
at University of Michigan. 
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Fig.1: Average Conditional Punishment Schedules 
 
 (a) Conditional Punishment Decisions (b) Conditional Punishment Decisions 
 to a Non-cooperator to a Cooperator  
0
0.2
0.4
0.6
0.8
1
1.2
1.4
0 0.5 1 1.5 2 2.5 3 3.5 4
The other members' average punishment points
non-cooperators
cooperators
all subjects
Punishment Points
0
0.2
0.4
0.6
0.8
1
1.2
1.4
0 0.5 1 1.5 2 2.5 3 3.5 4
The other members' average punishment points
non-cooperators
cooperators
all subjects
Punishment Points
10 
 
Table 1: Classification of Conditional Punishment Types 
Conditional punishment type All subjects Cooperator Non-cooperator 
\    
Free-rider 
28 
(53.8%) 
17 
(53.1%)  
11 
(55.0%) 
Conditional punisher 
12 
(23.1%) 
7 
(21.9%) 
5 
(25.0%) 
 Pro-social conditional punisher 8 5 3 
 
Anti-social conditional 
punisher 
4 2 2 
Other 
12 
(23.1%) 
8 
(25.0%) 
4 
(20.0%) 
 Other pro-social punisher 8 8 0 
 Other anti-social punisher 4 0 4 
Total number of subjects 52 32 20 
     
 
Notes: Numbers in parentheses are percentages of conditional punishment types in each column category.  
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Appendix A: Instructions 
Instructions 
You are now taking part in a decision-making experiment. Depending on your decisions and the 
decisions of other participants, you will be able to earn money in addition to the $5 guaranteed 
for your participation. Please read the following instructions carefully. 
 
During the experiment you are not allowed to communicate with other participants. If you have 
questions, raise your hand. One of us will come to answer your question. 
 
During the experiment your earnings will be calculated in points. At the end of the experiment 
your points will be converted to U.S. dollars at the following rate: 
 
1 point = $1 
 
(or each point will be exchanged for 1 dollar of real money). At the end of the experiment your 
total earnings (including the $5 participation fee) will be paid out to you in cash. 
 
The experiment consists of two phases.  
 
In the experiment, participants are randomly divided into groups of 4. This means that you are in 
a group with 3 other participants. You will be part of the same group throughout the entire 
experiment. No one knows which other participants are in your group, and no one will be 
informed who was in which group after the experiment.  
 
Phase 1 
 
Each group member, yourself included, will be given an endowment of 10 points.  In this phase, 
you and the other 3 group members simultaneously decide how to use the endowment. There are 
two possibilities: 
 
1. You can allocate 10 points to a group account. 
2. You can allocate 10 points to a private account. 
 
Your earnings depend on the total number of points in the group account, and the number of 
points in your private account. 
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How to calculate your earnings: 
Your earnings from your private account are equal to the number of points you allocated to the 
private account. That is, if you decide to allocate 10 points to the private account, you get 10 
points as your earnings. The points you allocate to your private account do not affect the 
earnings of the other group members.  
 
Your earnings from the group account equal the sum of points allocated to the group account by 
all 4 group members multiplied by 0.5. When you allocate 10 points to the group account, you 
and all other group members each get 5 points as earnings. For example, suppose that two 
members decide to allocate 10 points to the group account. Then, the sum of points in the group 
account is 20. The earnings of yours and each of the other group members from the group 
account are equal to 10 (= 20  0.5) points.  
 
In summary, your earnings are calculated with the following formula: 
 
(a) When you allocate 10 points to the private account: 
 
10 + 0.5  (sum of points allocated by 3 other group members to the group account)    
 
(b) When you allocate 10 points to the group account: 
 
0 + 0.5  (10 + sum of points allocated by 3 other group members to the group account)    
 
Note that you get 10 points as earnings when you allocate your endowment to your private 
account. If you instead allocate 10 points to your group account, your earnings from your 
allocation is 0.5  10 = 5 points. However, by allocating 10 points to the group account, the 
earnings of the other 3 group members also increase by 5 points. Therefore, the total group 
earnings are 5  4 = 20 points. Note that you also obtain earnings from points allocated to the 
group account by other 3 members. You obtain 0.5  10 = 5 points if another member allocates 
10 points to the group account. 
 
Example: 
Suppose that you and another member allocate 10 points to the group account, and the two other 
members of your group each allocate 10 points to the private account. In this case, the sum of the 
points in the group account is 20 points. You obtain 0 point from the private account, and 0.5  
20 = 10 points from the group account. Therefore, your earnings are 0 + 10 = 10 points. Another 
member that allocates 10 points to the group account also obtains 10 points as his or her earnings. 
The two members that allocate 10 points to the private account each get 10 points from the 
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private account, and 0.5  20 = 10 points from the group account; therefore their earnings are 
each 10 + 10 = 20 points. 
 
Please note that your earnings may be reduced after you make your allocation decision 
depending on the other members’ decisions. We will explain the reduction procedure more in 
detail in the instruction of Phase 2. 
 
---------------------------------------------------------------- 
 
If you have any questions so far, please raise your hand. When all questions are answered, we 
will move on to comprehension questions. 
 
Comprehension questions 
Please answer the following questions.  Raise your hand if you need help.  A member of the 
experiment team will come to help you and will check your answers when you are done. 
 
1. Suppose all four group members allocate 10 points to the private account. 
 
a) How much do you earn? _______________ 
 
b) How much do the other group members earn? _______________ 
 
2. Suppose all four group members allocate 10 points to the group account. 
 
a) How much do you earn? _______________ 
 
b) How much do the other group members earn? _______________ 
 
3. Suppose one group member allocate 10 points to the group account and two group members 
allocate 10 points to the private account. Answer the following: 
 
a) How much do you earn if you allocate 10 points to the private account? _______________ 
  
b) How much do you earn if you allocate 10 points to the group account? _______________ 
 
Any questions?  
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Instructions for Phase 2: 
 
In Phase 2, you will be shown the amount allocated to the group account by each of the other 
members in your group. In a box set at the right of the allocation information screen, you will be 
asked to enter an integer that you wish to use to reduce the earnings of the individual who made 
that allocation decision. Each point you allocate to reduce someone’s earnings reduces your 
own earnings by 1 point and reduces that individual’s earnings by 3 points.  You can assign 
reduction points from {0, 1, 2, 3, 4}. These decisions are unconditional. Your own earnings can 
be reduced in the same way by the decisions of others in your group.  You are free to leave any 
or all others’ earnings unchanged by entering 0’s in the relevant boxes. 
 
An example of your screen: 
     
 
Note: Numbers shown are for illustration only. 
 
Your earnings are calculated as: 
 
(i) Your earnings in Phase 1 minus reduction amounts due to your received reduction points 
 
minus 
 
(ii) The reduction points you assign to other members 
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Here, “the reduction amounts due to your received reduction points” are three times the total 
reduction points you received from the other three members. In case that your earnings become 
negative, you will only receive the participation fee of $5 as your payment today. 
 
There is another decision you are asked to make in this phase. Before you are informed of other 
members’ allocation decisions and make your reduction decisions for them, you will be asked to 
enter numbers, from {0, 1, 2, 3, 4}, into a form shown below. This form is called the 
“conditional reduction schedule.” In this form, you will conditionally indicate how many 
reduction points you would like to assign to a member, assuming that the two remaining 
members in your group on average assign the reduction amount shown to that member.  For 
example, in the screen image below in the top-left box, you’ll enter the number of reduction 
points you would like to assign if two other members do not assign any reduction points to a 
member (not you) that allocated 10 points to his or her private account; in the bottom-right box, 
the number of reduction points you want to assign if the other two assign an average of 4 
reduction points (thus, 8 points in total) to a member (not you) that allocated 10 points to the 
group account in the allocation stage.  
 
An example of your screen: 
  
 
 
The reduction amounts you enter in this form will affect your earnings in the following way: at 
the onset of Phase 2, after you and the others in your group fill in this conditional reduction 
decision form and click the “Continue” button, you are informed of Phase 1 allocation decisions 
by other members. Then, all members make unconditional reduction decisions as mentioned 
above. After that, one out of the four members’ conditional reduction schedules is randomly 
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selected to be used. The three members’ unconditional reduction decisions and the one member’s 
conditional reduction decision will determine their earnings in the way already described.   
 
For example, suppose that you (Subject 1) and Subject 2 allocate 10 points to the group account 
and that Subjects 3 and 4 in your group allocate 10 points to the private account. Suppose also 
that you are the group member who is randomly selected as the individual whose conditional 
reduction schedule is used. Suppose that Subjects 2 and 4 each assign reduction points of 0 point 
and 2 points, respectively, to Subject 3. Suppose that your conditional reduction schedule says 
that if other two assign on average reduction points of 1 point to a participant who allocates 10 
points to the private account, you will assign 2 reduction points. Then, you shall assign 2 
reduction points to Subject 3. As a result, 2 points will be deducted from your earnings, and 6 
points (= 23) will be deducted from the earnings of Subject 3. Together with the reduction 
points made by subjects 2 and 4 to Subject 3, 12 points will be deducted from the earnings of 
Subject 3. Your reduction decisions to Subjects 2 and 4 are determined in the same manner. 
 
Comprehension Questions: 
 
1.  When you assign 1 reduction point to another member, how many points will be deducted 
from the member? 
[                                               ] 
 
2. How many individuals’ conditional reduction schedules in a group are randomly selected to be 
used to determine their reduction decisions? 
[                                               ] 
 
Any questions? Once all questions are answered, we will move on to the experiment. 
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Appendix B: Additional Tables and Figures 
 
Table B.1: The Conditional Punishment Decision of Cooperator j to Non-cooperator i, and the Difference in Payoffs between i and j 
Others’ average punishment points  
to non-cooperator i 
Punishment points  
from cooperator j to non-cooperator i 
0 .5 1 1.5 2 2.5 3 3.5 4 
0 -10 -7 -4 -1 2 5 
min{8, 
5+5n} 
min{11, 
5+5n} 
min{14, 
5+5n} 
1 -8 -5 -2 1 4 
min{7, 
4+5n} 
min{10, 
4+5n} 
min{13, 
4+5n} 
4+5n 
2 -6 -3 0 3 
min{6, 
3+5n} 
min{9, 
3+5n} 
min{12, 
3+5n} 
3+5n 3+5n 
3 -4 -1 2 
min{5, 
2+5n} 
min{8, 
2+5n} 
min{11, 
2+5n} 
2+5n 2+5n 2+5n 
4 -2 1 
min{4, 
1+5n} 
min{7, 
1+5n} 
min{10, 
1+5n} 
1+5n 1+5n 1+5n 1+5n 
 
Notes: Each number in the table is the payoff of cooperator j minus that of non-cooperator i, assuming that j does not receive any punishment 
points from his or her group members. min{a, b} = a (b) if a ≤ b (a > b). If the number of cooperators except j is n  {0, 1, 2}, then, the payoff of j 
before the punishment stages is 5+5n and that of i is 15+5n. If i receives in total more than 
     
 
 punishment points, then, the payoff of i is 0, and 
the difference in payoffs between i and j becomes 5+5n−c, where c is the punishment points from j to i. 
Remark: The payoff of cooperator j is strictly higher than that of non-cooperator i even if j does not assign any punishment points to i, 
if the other two members on average assign more than 1.5 punishment points to i.  
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Table B.2: The Total Average Conditional Punishment Schedules for Each Target (a cooperator 
or a non-cooperator) 
(1) The total average conditional punishment schedules 
Dependent  
Variable 
Independent  
Variable 
    
Subject j’s conditional punishment decisions to a target  {0, 1, 2, 3, 4} 
(1) (2) (3) (4) 
    
     
(a) 1{the target is a non-cooperator}  0.59*** -2.20** 0.35** -3.12*** 
 (0.13) (0.88) (0.14) (1.05) 
     
(b) 1{the target is a cooperator}  0.32*** -4.14*** 0.21* -4.78*** 
 (0.12) (1.10) (0.11) (1.34) 
     
(c) Other members’ 
average punishment 
points to the target  1{the 
target is a non-cooperator} 
---- ---- 
0.12** 
(.052) 
0.46** 
(0.21) 
     
(d) Other members’ 
average punishment 
points to the target  1{the 
target is a cooperator} 
---- ---- 
0.055* 
(0.052) 
0.33** 
(0.15) 
     
# of Observations 936 936 936 936 
Log Pseudolikelihood ---- -798.4 ---- -793.9 
F 10.86 7.43 5.78 5.85 
Prob > F 0.0001 0.0006 0.0006 0.0001 
R-squared 0.1819 ---- 0.1934 ---- 
     
Test Results     
     
F test for H0: (a) = (b)     
F 5.26 8.83 0.87 0.32 
p-value (two-sided) 0.026** 0.0030*** 0.3567 0.5717 
     
F test for H0: (c) = (d)     
F ---- ---- 1.82 3.56 
p-value (two-sided) ---- ---- 0.1837 0.0597* 
     
 
Notes: Linear regressions with no constant terms and with robust standard errors clustered by subject ID in columns 
(1) and (3), and Tobit regressions with no constant terms and with robust standard errors clustered by subject ID in 
columns (2) and (4). The numbers of left-(right-) censored observations are 729(41) in columns (2) and (4).  
1{the target is a cooperator} =1 if the target of punishment is a cooperator; = 0 otherwise. 
1{the target is a non-cooperator} =1 if the target of punishment is a non-cooperator; = 0 otherwise. 
  *, **, and *** indicate significance at the 0.10 level, at the 0.05 level and at the 0.01 level, respectively. 
Result: The average strength of conditional punishment to a non-cooperator is significantly 
stronger than that to a cooperator as shown in columns (1) and (2). The total average 
conditional punishment decisions to a person are significantly positively increasing in the 
remaining two members’ average punishment to that person, whether the person is a cooperator 
or a non-cooperator as shown in columns (3) and (4).   
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(2) The average conditional punishment schedules by cooperative type (a cooperator or a non-
cooperator) 
Dependent  
variable 
Independent  
Variable 
    
Subject j’s conditional punishment decisions to a target 
(1) (2) (3) (4) 
    
     
(a) 1{the target is a non-cooperator 
and subject j is a non-cooperator} 
0.73*** 
(0.25) 
-1.59 
(1.09) 
0.41 
(0.27) 
-2.83** 
(1.39) 
     
(b) 1{the target is a non-cooperator 
and subject j is a cooperator} 
0.50*** 
(0.13) 
-2.30** 
(0.93) 
0.32** 
(0.16) 
-2.93*** 
(1.08) 
     
(c) 1{the target is a cooperator and 
subject j is a non-cooperator} 
0.69** 
(0.27) 
-1.91* 
(1.13) 
0.57** 
(0.27) 
-2.32** 
(1.17) 
     
(d) 1{the target is a cooperator and 
subject j is a cooperator} 
0.090 
(0.064) 
-6.17*** 
(1.81) 
-0.0097 
(0.0074) 
-7.68 
(1.84) 
     
Other members’ average 
punishment points to the 
target  variable (a) 
---- ---- 
0.16** 
(.069) 
0.60** 
(0.27) 
     
Other members’ average 
punishment points to the 
target  variable (b) 
---- ---- 
0.091 
(0.073) 
0.33 
(0.29) 
     
Other members’ average 
punishment points to the 
target  variable (c) 
---- ---- 
0.063 
(0.053) 
0.22 
(0.17) 
     
Other members’ average 
punishment points to the 
target  variable (d) 
---- ---- 
0.050 
(0.036) 
0.71** 
(0.15) 
     
# of Observations 936 936 936 936 
Log Pseudolikelihood ---- -767.7 ---- -761.8 
F 6.14 3.20 3.63 6.13 
Prob > F 0.0004 0.0127 0.0021 0.0000 
R-squared 0.2223 ---- 0.2346 ---- 
     
Test Results     
     
F test for H0: (a) = (b)     
F 0.69 0.37 ---- ---- 
p-value (two-sided) 0.4093 0.5410 ---- ---- 
     
F test for H0: (c) = (d)     
F 4.70 5.06 ---- ---- 
p-value (two-sided) 0.0349*** 0.0248** ---- ---- 
     
F test for H0: (a) = (c)     
F 0.03 0.14 ---- ---- 
p-value (two-sided) 0.8631 0.7100 ---- ---- 
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F test for H0: (a) = (c)     
F 11.79 8.78 ---- ---- 
p-value (two-sided) 0.0012*** 0.0031*** ---- ---- 
     
 
Notes: Linear regressions with no constant terms and with robust standard errors clustered by subject ID in columns 
(1) and (3), and Tobit regressions with no constant terms and with robust standard errors clustered by subject ID in 
columns (2) and (4). The numbers of left-(right-) censored observations are 729(41) in columns (2) and (4).  
1{the target is a non-cooperator and subject j is a non-cooperator} =1 if the target of punishment is a non-cooperator and j is a non-
cooperator; = 0 otherwise. 1{the target is a non-cooperator and subject j is a cooperator} =1 if the target of punishment is a non-
cooperator and j is a cooperator; = 0 otherwise. 1{the target is a cooperator and subject j is a non-cooperator} =1 if the target of 
punishment is a cooperator and j is a non-cooperator; = 0 otherwise. 1{the target is a cooperator and subject j is a cooperator} =1 if 
the target of punishment is a cooperator and j is a cooperator; = 0 otherwise.    
   *, **, and *** indicate significance at the 0.10 level, at the 0.05 level and at the 0.01 level, respectively. 
 
Result: The cooperators on average conditionally assign significantly larger punishment points 
to a non-cooperator than to a cooperator. The average strength of conditional punishment points 
assigned by cooperators to a non-cooperator is statistically similar to the average strength of 
conditional punishment points assigned by non-cooperators to a non-cooperator. The non-
cooperators on average assign punishment points both to a non-cooperator and to a cooperator 
at a statistically similar strength.  
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Table B.3: Individual Conditional Punishment Decisions and Unconditional Punishment 
Decisions  
 
Dependent  
Variable 
 
 
Independent  
Variable 
      
Subject j’s unconditional punishment decisions to a target i  {0, 1, 2, 3, 4} 
(a) i is a non-cooperator (b) i is a cooperator 
All 
decisions 
j is a 
cooperator 
j is a non-
cooperator 
All 
decisions 
j is a 
cooperator 
j is a non-
cooperator 
(a1) (a2) (a3) (b1) (b2) (a4) 
      
       
Pro-social conditional 
punishment dummy
1
 
0.89*** 
(0.19) 
0.90*** 
(0.23) 
0.88** 
(0.33) 
---- ---- ---- 
       
Free-rider dummy
2
 
0.31* 
(0.18) 
0.41* 
(0.22) 
0.10 
(0.10) 
---- ---- ---- 
       
Anti-social conditional 
punishment dummy
3
 
---- ---- ---- 
1.43*** 
(0.18) 
0.50*** 
(0.69) 
1.58*** 
(0.29) 
       
Non-anti-social  
punishment dummy
4
 
---- ---- ---- 0.073 
(0.075) 
0.00 
(0.014) 
0.20 
(0.18) 
       
# of Observations 60 42 18 96 54 42 
F 7.05 9.22 3.62 31.72 26.00 15.75 
Prob > F 0.0023 0.0005 0.0506 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 
Adjusted R-squared 0.3066 0.2814 0.2252 0.3902 0.4808 0.4126 
       
 
Notes: Linear regressions with no constant terms. 
1
 The pro-social conditional punishment dummy equals 1 if j 
conditionally assigns positive punishment points at least once to a non-cooperator in the conditional punishment 
stage (i.e., all conditional punishment types but free-riders); 0 otherwise. 
2
 The free-rider dummy equals 1 if j is a 
free-rider; 0 otherwise. 
3
 The anti-social conditional punishment dummy equals 1 if j conditionally assigns positive 
punishment points at least once to a cooperator in the conditional punishment stage (i.e., an anti-social conditional 
punisher or an other anti-social punisher); 0 otherwise. 
4
 The non-anti-social punishment dummy equals 1 if j is 
neither an anti-social conditional punisher nor an other anti-social punisher; 0 otherwise. *, **, and *** indicate 
significance at the 0.10 level, at the 0.05 level and at the 0.01 level, respectively. 
Remark: The definition of the conditional punishment types (pro-social conditional punishers, anti-social conditional 
punishers, other pro-social punishers, other anti-social punishers) is found on page 13 (next page) of this online 
supplementary content. 
  
13 
 
Fig. B.1: Individual Conditional Punishment Schedules and Classification Results 
We define a free-rider as a subject who does not punish a person, no matter how many 
punishment points the other two members assign to that person. We define a pro-social (anti-
social) conditional punisher as a subject whose Spearman’s ρ between his conditional 
punishment points to a non-cooperator and the remaining members’ average punishment points 
to the non-cooperator is significantly positive at the 5% level and whose conditional punishment 
decisions to a cooperator are (are not) always 0.  As for the rest of the subjects, we define an 
other pro-social (anti-social) punisher as a subject who conditionally punishes a non-cooperator 
but whose Spearman’s ρ is not significantly positive at the 5% level unlike conditional punishers 
and whose conditional punishment decisions to a cooperator are (are not) always 0.  
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Classification Results: 
(a) FR (Free-rider: 53.8%): subjects 2, 7, 9,11, 12, 15, 16, 17, 20, 21, 23, 26, 30, 31, 33, 34, 35, 36, 
38, 40, 42, 43, 45,46, 47, 48, 49, 51 
(b) PCP (Pro-social conditional punisher: 15.4%): subjects 3, 8, 14, 19, 22, 25, 50, 52  
(c) ACP (Anti-social conditional punisher: 7.7%): subjects 13, 27, 29, 32 
(d) OP (Other pro-social punisher: 15.4%): subject 1, 5, 6, 10, 28, 39, 41, 44 
(e) OA (Other anti-social punisher: 7.7%): subjects 4, 18, 24, 37 
